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The Way Things Were 
 
In the 20th century the world’s defense communities often produced spectacularly 
inaccurate forecasting and intelligence reports. Outdated ideas were clung to as 
dogma and new developments not embraced with disturbing regularity. 
 
One hundred years ago Great Britain stood tall as the world’s superpower and 
exuded hubris, unaware that much of the oncoming century would offer it a bitter 
diet of nemesis and decline, a future  many British politicians tried to ignore, 
though the signs were long visible. For example, in 1906 the Royal Navy 
introduced submarines into its arsenal and remained content with this innovation, 
thinking that it gave it a big edge over its enemies.
1
 Eight years later, in September 
1914, however, the German U9 submarine torpedoed and sank three British 
cruisers in the North Sea, killing 1,459 officers and crew.
2
 Nevertheless, the 
submarine has continued to evolve and remains a vital part of any major nation’s 
defense capability, a trend likely to continue. The importance of marine warfare 
increased during both World Wars
3
 and throughout the Cold War, and, despite 
some drawbacks since 1991, this tendency in the UK to depend on the navy as a 
major strategic instrument will remain for decades to come.  
 
Aircraft are also an essential part of any military complement. As early as October 
1908 S. F. Cody, an American, made the first military flight in Britain, covering 
1,390 feet in British Army Aircraft No. 1. The Italians first used a heavier-than-air 
aircraft – in a combat situation – to drop a bomb on Turkish forces on November 1, 
1911. Once again, within a short time military combat aircraft evolved to 
revolutionize twenty-first century warfare, operating from both land and sea. Some 
now opine that the present Joint Strike Jet Fighters may be the last generation of 
manned supersonic combat aircraft. Maybe, but this “last generation” may endure 
for more than 50 years (and the much upgraded B-52 bombers may even last a 
century as a front line plane), since unmanned aircraft (drones) have hardly begun 
to realize their full capability. In this sense, there appears to be little, if any, 
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indication of a significant swing taking place from air attack towards air defense 
capabilities.
4
 
 
The first Dreadnought class battleship entered service in the British Royal Navy in 
December 1906, which thus completed the transformation of its fleet from one 
based around the wooden battleships of Nelson of Trafalgar’s time to one based 
around steel.
5
 Forty years later battleships had already become outdated, although 
they lingered on as a means of conducting the bombardment of shore sites for some 
decades, only to be gradually replaced with airplanes and submarines. These new 
weapons took over the role that such heavy ships had been designed for, putting the 
purpose of retaining such ships in question.
6
 
 
The tank, the dominant vehicle of 20st century land warfare, emerged only a 
decade later, in 1916, at the battle of Flers-Courcelette near the Somme. Today it is 
still powerful, but the future of warfare may depend on having the right balance of 
armor plating, lethality, mobility and air transportation capability.
7
 Like 
submarines and aircraft, tanks will have to become more adaptable in the 21st 
century if they are to maintain a significant position in the arsenals of the world’s 
defense forces. 
 
Some items of military hardware, though, have stood the test of time better. The 
machine gun was perhaps the dominant small artillery weapon in the period prior 
to World War I. The Gatling gun was first used by the U.S. Army as early as 1864, 
and adopted by the British in 1880. Various models and designs of machine guns 
are still widely used today, and seem likely to continue to be the hand weapons of 
choice as warfare evolves. Like the adaptable Kalashnikov AK-47, they are now 
universal close quarters armaments of choice, including for criminals.
8
 
 
Today we have the C4ISR (the U.S. term for Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance),
9
 derived from and 
enabled by the digital computer and the chip age. However, in 1906 both the 
computer and chip technology were far into the future.
10
 Command and control 
functions certainly existed, but their scope was restricted by the technology and 
human understanding of the time.
11
 Now the computing power of chips is doubling 
every 18 to 24 months, and the only limitation to what can be achieved is probably 
human imagination.
12
 The evolution of this sphere of modern weaponry is of 
crucial importance to the nature of warfare in the 21st century. 
 
One hundred years ago space travel and “star wars” technology were things out of 
science fiction, yet just over 50 years later the first Sputnik orbiter was sent into 
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space. Today, the main purpose of space in warfare is to station sensors and global 
communications systems. Missiles fly through space to hit their targets. The next 
step to acquiring the capabilities for conducting a war in space will be a small one. 
It may be that the use of space will be to the 21st century what the use of the air 
was to the 20th.
13
 
 
In 1906 nuclear science was in its infancy. Yet, through European research and 
American development, a nuclear bomb was dropped on Hiroshima at the end of 
World War II, less than 40 years later. Since then, the principal purpose of having 
nuclear weapons has been to use them as a deterrent, since actually setting them on 
an enemy would assure mutual destruction.
14
 This standoff, though, may not 
continue, and the main question concerning nuclear weapons in the future may not 
be their enormous capabilities but who should have access to them, how they will 
be activated and under what circumstances.   
 
Ironically, the first uses of chemical and biological warfare are mired in history, 
and there are international conventions limiting their use.
15
 But these conventions 
are weak, and chemical and biological weapons will continue to be used when an 
advantage in doing so is perceived by the owner. Again, when and how they are to 
be used are the key questions. 
 
The will to fight, to win, and to go on fighting was strong in 1906. The antagonists 
of World War I had been squaring up to each other long before then. The idea of 
establishing an international collective security organization (the future League of 
Nations), which was already floating in the first  decade of the 20th century, was 
pushed aside as unnecessary by the great powers even before World War I. The 
United Nations and NATO were only created after a second monumentally 
destructive world war.
16
  
 
The fighting resilience demonstrated between 1914 and 1918 was phenomenal and 
was seen again between 1939 and 1945. In today’s asymmetrical security 
environment, however, strategic resilience is more problematic because asymmetry 
can be reversed. The will of a nation is to a great extent driven by the media.
17
 The 
media tells a people at war what they want to see or hear, and what other people 
and nations want them to see and hear. The media’s technological sophistication 
has made possible instant, globalized and intrusive coverage of daily events. The 
media, in its many forms of information and intelligence, is increasingly 
influencing decision-making processes. 
One more stable factor in this mix is the function and role of different groups of 
people. The 20th century saw a gradual strengthening of the value military 
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organizations put on service persons, and increasingly servicewomen, in developed 
countries. Now women, in highly industrial countries, are central to any military 
operation.  
 
However, the general conclusion that can be drawn from the 20th century military 
experience is that, overall, it is difficult to see why the military should be better at 
long-term forecasting in 2012 than it was in 1906. 
 
 
The Way the Military Is Going 
 
If there is a link between the world of 1906 and that of 2012, it is diffuse and weak, 
more the product of chaos theory than a proverbial golden thread. So far in the 21st 
century the world has been shocked and surprised by international events. There is 
little convincing evidence that this tendency to be shocked and surprised will not 
continue into the indefinite future. 
 
The terrorist acts of 9/11 gave a vicious and profound wake up call to the United 
States; they changed much of the global security environment. Yet, particularly in 
retrospect, a steady flow of clues and precursors had made this atrocity predictable. 
9/11 was not technology-driven, as the “weapons of mass destruction” used were 
passenger planes – commercial vessels, but full of fuel and people – and the 
triggering weapons were Stanley box cutters. The terrorists had an effective C2 
system (command and control system), but the hardware for this was commercially 
available. 
 
Although the 9/11 events also blasted a country like the United Kingdom, removed 
from the United States by an ocean, occurrences there in the previous 18 months, 
including a drivers’ strike over fuel, widespread floods and a foot and mouth 
epidemic, had already persuaded the British government that the country’s 
infrastructure was disjointed and fragile. Having espoused an “expeditionary 
strategy” since at least 1998, Britain assumed that any threats to the country would 
come from abroad. The bomb attacks in London of 7 July 2005, in which the 
terrorists were “home grown,” blurred the distinction between internal and external 
threats, and hence responses. 
 
The U.S.-led military campaign in Iraq, which reached the centre of Baghdad so 
swiftly in March/April of 2003, demonstrated the success of the transformation of 
the U.S. army into a military force built on speed, precision, firepower and 
knowledge. The combat capability of the force was barely tested, as Saddam’s 
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forces melted before the American advance, but the appearance of a rag-bag of 
Fedayeen, in the midst of this grand advance, clearly discomforted U.S. land 
forces. Moreover, the absence of appropriate planning for what would be done after 
Baghdad had been “liberated” resulted in the military coalition losing the political 
initiative on the ground, and by the same token the goodwill of the local population 
in the process.
18
 The turbulent, shapeless and deadly insurgency that filled in the 
void on the Iraqi side may be a portent of the sort of irregular warfare countries 
will have to deal with in the future. 
 
In today’s world, the military focuses predominantly on land based irregular 
warfare, even if attacks can also come from the air and sea. However, despite the 
continued threat these pose, international air and sea trade transport continues, and 
is even increasing.
19
 The bulk of trade is moved by sea, in containers, and as trade 
continues to expand to developing economies and developed countries attempt to 
more effectively limit pollution, particularly carbon emissions, the proportion of 
trade moved by sea will certainly not decrease. In fact it seems likely that sea 
transported trade (essentially by containers) will increase even further.
20
 If sea 
transported trade increases, and the merchandise is considered valuable by criminal 
organizations and nations that are in conflict with the destinations of these ships, 
they will become more and more tempting targets. If such attacks become 
common, they will be fiercely resisted, initially at various choke points and then 
further out in the open oceans. Submarines will have a vital role to play in this 
expanding security issue and they will be concealed in the deep oceans.
21
 
 
The future importance of intelligence was demonstrated by the military campaign 
in Iraq. As a result of intense and extended technical and human intelligence 
gathering, the United States was able to make a preemptive strike, 24 hours before 
the invasion of Iraq, on a bunker at Dora Farm, southeast of Baghdad, in which 
Saddam and his sons were supposed to be hiding. The bombs and missiles hit the 
farm, but it turned out not to be a bunker and Saddam and his sons were not there.
22
 
Here intelligence failed miserably, as it did so many times in Iraq. The lesson of 
this blunder should resound through the rest of this century: Substandard intel-
ligence mixed with wishful thinking and political expediency will beget failure. 
 
 
Dynamics of Change 
 
Change in the defense and security fields is bound to occur because, around the 
world, countries’ military and criminal organizations always want to improve their 
capability to do what they want to do. There are concurrent political and industrial 
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advantages to doing so, but undertaking changes generate huge costs. Sometimes 
an opportunity arises to make a leap forward through a specific technological 
advance or accumulated evolutionary steps. Sometimes different tools offer nations 
the opportunity to conduct the same or different tasks in different ways. Change is 
disruptive, but widely accepted as being both inevitable and essential. Change is to 
the defense planner what the ice-bath is to the well-honed athlete. It is not, 
however, a process which can be undertaken without constraints, and the first 
constraint is financial.  
 
Research can be funded, but not all the best minds can be rallied at the same time 
to do the research.
23
 It follows that further development, production and support are 
primarily dependent upon funding sources. It also means that over a period of time, 
and assuming great fortitude and will power within a nation, a sustained rise in 
economic strength should lead to that nation gaining even greater defense and 
security capabilities. With that in mind,, it can be predicted that the United States 
will continue to be the preeminent military power and that the capabilities of China 
and India may rise to challenge those of the United States, at least in American 
eyes.
24
 Meanwhile, Europe may collectively have the economic strength to 
compete with the U.S. but lack the concerted will to use it to challenge current and 
emerging great powers.
25
 For its part, Russia may battle with Europe for resources 
and control of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, with the longer term aim of 
reestablishing itself as a military superpower.
26
 
 
Powerful countries should not count on being liked and admired. They are more 
likely to be opposed and annoyed asymmetrically. The success or failure of 
asymmetric action will depend on a number of factors. Key to this is whether 
asymmetric C2 can flourish when used imaginatively and when unconstrained by 
national and international laws, morality and electoral accountability, or whether it 
will be disrupted by the capabilities of stronger powers, which will be able to 
intercept, analyze and react to electronic emissions.
27
 Linked to this issue is the 
question of whether an ever greater proportion of high-capability IT systems will 
be available commercially. Another factor to consider is that small and agile 
organizations may be able to operate by making minimal, hidden and secure 
emissions.
28
 These issues may become critical to the future of insurgencies and 
terrorism during the 21st century. 
 
Also affecting the future of insurgents and terrorists will be the availability of 
finance.
29
 This is a critical factor, but the amounts of money required do not have 
to be enormous. On the other hand, huge funds will be needed if terrorists/ 
insurgents decide they must use chemical, biological or nuclear agents.
30
 For sure, 
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terrorists and insurgents will act, to a greater or lesser extent, ruthlessly. The 
probability seems high that in due course chemical and biological weapons (CBW 
weapons) will be put to use by this type of enemy. That, however, may not come 
without risk to the attackers, for it will not only expose them, before and after they 
spread chemical or biological substances or launch a nuclear missile, to 
countermeasures, but also possibly alienate their strategic base of support. 
 
This aspect of military defense in the 21st century has to be linked to the most 
important factor in warfare: maintaining the will to win. The population of a 
country and its government may go soft, becoming reluctant even to allow their 
military to continue with dangerous and morally debatable military operations, 
especially in faraway lands. However, faced with threats to vital national interests, 
energy security or even national survival, democracies may get tougher, shifting 
the delicate balance between security and human rights imperatives. Such a balance 
presents a challenge to all governments, which need to educate their populations 
about how not to be terrorized by terrorists. As most statistics show, deaths on the 
roads kill far more people than terrorists, and the outcome of a flu pandemic would 
be worse than the release of a chemical substance in an urban area. Insurgents and 
terrorists usually have an uncomplicated approach to warfare, some seeing death as 
desirable and glorious. At the core, insurgents and terrorist groups may not break 
up into smaller groups, but their supporters and sympathizers may drift away.
31
 
 
Many governments have conflict resolution programs and a mandate to reduce and 
remove the root causes of opposition, revolt, insurgencies or terrorism. The 
difficulty is that long-term and soft security measures often clash with short-term 
and hard security ones, to the advantage of neither. Creating a balance between 
hard, soft, long and short-term security measures is, for states, critical to obtaining 
favorable outcomes. 
 
Change, especially when it involves major material disruption and high costs, is 
likely to be resisted. But there are also risks to opposing change. The changes made 
in the U.S. Army enabled the United States to successfully invade Iraq in 2003. On 
the other hand, the U.S. seemed much less successful in making needed changes 
after the initial objective, getting to central Baghdad, had been achieved. There will 
usually be less perceived risk in doing more of what one has already been doing for 
a certain period of time. This is especially the case for countries which are hard-
pressed to meet current financial commitments. Expensive change with added risk 
will appear unattractive, even if the potential gain is substantial. Hence, countries 
will tend to prefer lower-cost, lower-risk and lower-gain options. This may well be 
a false calculation, not least because any subsequent requirement will force a 
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country to catch up in a hurry, elevating the risk of making fatal mistakes. In any 
case, change across nations has proven generally inefficient again and again.  
 
A policy of no change or minimum change is also likely to be self-defeating and 
increase costs in the long term. A quick survey of the last century demonstrates that 
its enduring certainties about warfare were almost all proven wrong.
32
 To invest in 
a single option – or a few options – that diverge wildly from contemporary 
practices may be heroic, but not necessarily helpful. A systematic approach to 
anticipating change requires an analysis of risk against gain, and graded options for 
investment. 
 
The rate of equipment capability improvement will vary greatly. Some platforms 
will become venerable, some will go into oblivion. The last B-52 was withdrawn 
from front line service almost 100 years after first entering into service, but the 
capability of the B-52 had been upgraded several times during the aircraft’s life 
and it had taken on different tasks. Within the same platform, weapons systems can 
very rapidly be enhanced. In seeking new capabilities, the long cycle times of 
major platforms have to be able to accommodate the very short timescales of 
system updates. Successful changes in equipment capability are also dependent on 
the quality and adaptability of the people manning the equipment, and this in turn 
depends mainly on education, training and the quality of the trainers.
33
 Finally, 
change depends on the intentions and decisions of political leaders (in a 
democracy, civil leaders). President Truman’s decision to drop an atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima, however highly controversial and morally debatable, induced a flood of 
change, as did President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in March 2003. Both were 
discretionary decisions. 
 
Since the end of World War I the search for effective supranational security has 
continued, but not unabated. After World War II the emergence of a “Cold War” 
between the Western and the Communist geopolitical blocs justified the creation of 
NATO in 1949, but the collapse of the Soviet Union saw the Alliance struggling to 
transform itself and find another raison d’être. Perhaps it has done so in theory and 
on the surface, but its internal functioning and practices remain in doubt.
34
 Today’s 
security environment has not proved propitious for either NATO or the United 
Nations.
35
 Challenges lie ahead for both, and neither seems as agile, determined 
and effective as they should or could be. In Great Britain there is a famous saying: 
“fine words butter no parsnips” (meaning that words alone are useless). Inter-
national institutions are awash with fine words, but the parsnips remain unbuttered. 
They could change for the better, but things may have to get worse before the 
international community is forced into taking resolute and enduring action. 
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When democracies wage war they now demand more from their people, not in 
terms of sacrifice, for the casualties of the two world wars were far higher than 
those which have occurred so far in the 21st century, but in terms of their 
servicemen and women since they are becoming increasingly valuable assets, 
requiring consistently higher skill levels, while retaining the traditional military 
virtues.
36
 As these individuals become better trained and more capable – and at the 
same time more costly – their numbers will tend to fall. Yet military personnel are 
becoming indivisible, and, no matter how well networked and equipped they are, 
they will still be needed in quite large numbers in each individual nation. This 
poses cost-effectiveness and demographic dilemmas. 
 
Then there are the “unknowns.” The genuine “unknowns” are beyond rational and 
fact-based forecasting. But there are “unknowns” that can be more easily included 
in strategic calculation, and through imaginative extrapolation from what is 
anticipated one can look for and find needles in haystacks and bits of gold on 
beaches. Many unknowns have a low probability of occurring, but coping well with 
them can produce a very high gain for military planners. Addressing these 
unknowns should be pursued against the odds. 
 
 
Snapshots of 21st Century Warfare 
 
There will be contrasts between 21st century warfare and the forms we have 
previously witnessed.
37
 For example, highly developed societies will attempt to 
“engage the enemy more closely” (Horatio Nelson′s famous order from Trafalgar) 
from further away. An example of this may be the use of the Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV), which as a system uses as many people as manned aircraft but is 
less risky, cheaper and more effective. While UAVs may be flown, and therefore 
attacks can be carried out with precision by pilots located thousands of kilometers 
from these aircrafts, “boots on the ground” will still be needed, and still in large 
numbers. But the “boots” will need to be networked, skilled and supported. 
 
Networks will be key enablers. The capability growth of C4ISR will continue to be 
phenomenal. But so will the key challenge of providing a comprehensive, global 
and detailed picture of the world’s “hot spots.” Providing networks for all seasons 
and all people is not yet within reach. Furthermore, networks can be frustrated, and 
to a greater or lesser extent countered.
38
 Forward leaps in technological 
development will become available to most countries, thereby reducing any of the 
decisive advantages gained by one or some states. Nevertheless, if the power of 
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computers continues to rise almost exponentially during the next decades, the 
advances made will not only be huge but also surely unpredictable. 
Artificial intelligence, nanotechnology and biological computation are among the 
most important developing technologies and are bound to change the face of armed 
conflicts. The need for accurate, timely and appropriate intelligence will grow. 
Failures in intelligence are unlikely to be eliminated and could have increasingly 
severe and global effects, because intelligence systems will be far-reaching and 
ostensibly capable of monitoring almost all villages on the planet.
39
 
 
The multiplicity of actors involved in complex military operations and their varied 
contributions, requirements and mindsets represent huge challenges for the 
development of C4ISR. For many, even the use of the words “command and 
control” is anathema. The journey to improvements in C4ISR is expected to be 
long, complex and, in many instances, characterized by many countercultural 
developments.
40
 
 
Asymmetric opponents, whether insurgents or terrorists, will proliferate, and under 
loose franchises even cooperate, at least for some decades. The use of military 
capability may not be proportional to the enemy fought against in the case of 
asymmetric conflicts.
41
 The virtual dimension of military operations in fighting an 
enemy ready to employ asymmetrical means will become dominant and the 
national will may be increasingly targeted by these fighters. The most secretive and 
loosely structured terrorist organizations will eventually be drawn into a media 
war. This may initially be of their choosing, but may open up vulnerabilities in 
their virtual armor. 
 
Terrorism will come and go cyclically, with atrocity levels ratcheting up. Islamic 
extremism will peak in the next thirty years and then fade, as negotiations are 
progressively accepted by all parties. Also, during the same period more and more 
powerful weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are likely to be used, alongside 
biological, chemical and nuclear agents. In the long run, though, states’ and 
international organizations’ capability to prevent or preempt the use of these 
supremely deadly weapons looks problematic. During next thirty years the ability 
of the West to weaken support for extremists both within and outside their 
communities will prove the decisive factor.
42
 
 
There will be a drift away from unrestricted conflicts, but wars in support of vital 
interests and for national survival will be harshly contested.
43
 Wars will be mostly 
fought for the same old historical reasons: resources, prejudices, pride, 
humanitarian imperatives, perceived morality and self-defense.
44
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Even the United States will increasingly come to terms with the need for 
multinational military and security organizations, but many nations will feel 
disinclined to bear their fair share of this burden.
45
 They will not take the necessary 
steps to make collective security effective. Permanent multinational security 
institutions are unlikely to develop conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peace-
keeping and reconstruction strategies commensurate with their military and 
intelligence capabilities.
46
 “Coalitions of the willing” are likely to be favored, with 
some states developing deeper and more enduring interstate relations than others. 
Interoperability will grow between some partners, based on their self-interest and 
hard work, but also on cultural, technical, doctrinal, logistic and training factors. 
Interoperabilities of the mind will be difficult to develop.
47
 
 
What one might cruelly call the “Africa syndrome” will not go away. This term 
refers to phenomena such as localized and regional genocide, frequent crimes 
against humanity or war crimes, using primitive and/or outdated weapons which 
are often unknown to most other parts of the world.
48
 These phenomena are not 
confined to the African continent, nor will they be in the future. But some of the 
most terrible recent cases have occurred there. Strangely, the developed world 
seems to be more often than not myopic about gestating horrendous conflicts on 
the “Dark Continent” and is blindsided by them more often than not. International 
institutions should not be expected to succeed in preventing all the cataclysms 
hitting Africa, although the need for them to do so will certainly rise. 
 
Due to the increasing virtual dimension of military operations and the availability 
of global information, traditional military operations will increasingly be seen to be 
but one of many strands of what is sometimes called the “comprehensive 
approach.” There may be two problems with this approach: First, the military 
contribution will tend to be dominant in the earlier stages of a campaign and then 
fade as the campaign evolves; second, the military will still tend to be the most 
appropriate structured institutions to organize and coordinate the overall effort. 
Such an arrangement may not be popular with certain national and international 
partners.
49
 
 
Maintaining the determination to win and survive will remain a crucial factor 
throughout the 21st century. Sometimes, however, it will be almost totally 
submerged by the intensity of the technological and information-based 
environment. Hence, winning may become an unclear concept, but subverting or 
modifying the will of the enemy, in its various forms, will remain central to any 
approach to modern day warfare. 
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Sadly, in the 21st century we cannot rule out the possibility of massive and 
unconstrained conventional wars being fought between military superpowers.
50
 
Such wars are on the horizon, as nuclear proliferation extends to currently non 
nuclear countries, and may include nuclear exchanges causing colossal human 
casualties and the creation of contaminated wastelands. Such a war could be a third 
world military conflict. This seems unlikely to happen in the next 20 years, but the 
century has eighty- eight more years to run. 
 
Armed forces personnel will become harder to attract in the right numbers and with 
the right qualities and skills. Nevertheless, the gradually diminishing numbers of 
raw recruits will be offset by their increasing skill levels and refined qualities. 
Maintaining this better quality of human resources will remain critical to the 
prevention and resolution of conflicts. 
 
The forecasters of 1906, given full knowledge of what is commonplace in 2012, 
would be staggered at the differences with their own day and the rapid changes 
which have taken place in warfare. Given that the rate of change today is 
accelerating and will probably continue to do so, we should accept that we lack the 
vision and the metrics to describe accurately what warfare will be like towards the 
end of this century. There will be monsters and there will be unknowns, some of 
which we are only starting to fully understand. But we should be alert for unknown 
unknowns and shocks, for they will certainly occur.  
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Assumptions and Inherent Contradictions 
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The link between the world of 1906 and that of 2012 is diffuse and weak; it is more the 
product of chaos theory than a proverbial golden thread. So far in the 21st century the world 
has been shocked and surprised by dramatic international events. There is little convincing 
evidence that this tendency to be shocked and surprised will not continue into the indefinite 
future. In today’s world, the military focuses predominantly on land based irregular 
warfare, even if attacks can also come from the air and sea. However, despite the continued 
threat these pose, international air and sea trade transport continues, and is even increasing. 
Change in the defense and security fields is bound to occur because, around the world, 
countries’ military and criminal organizations always want to improve their capability to do 
what they want to do. Powerful countries should not count on being liked and admired. 
They are more likely to be opposed and annoyed asymmetrically. This article is about the 
contrasts between 21st century warfare and the forms we have previously witnessed. Highly 
developed societies will attempt to “engage the enemy more closely” from further away, 
the use of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) being the most prominent example. 
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